

1st KETs workshop

Methodology for the validation of KETs in the context of CAD

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HEADSTART: built upon ongoing activities













Project liaisons in the original proposal: 28 projects



36 projects available in current list





WP5 – all project duration:


EXPERT GROUP PARTICIPATION

- Join as associated partner and our expert group
- Join the discussion group of your interest:
 - Cyber-security
 - Communications (V2X)
 - Positioning
 - Scenario selection
 - Consumer testing (NCAP)
 - Type approval
- Provide needs and requirements and evaluate project (intermediate) results

- Three **K**ey **E**nabling **T**echnologies Work together on:
- ✓ Joint cooperation between projects for testing validation and certification purposes
- ✓ Align your project with the harmonized methodology and tools developed within HEADSTART
- ✓ Become one of our use cases!



Project's Concept




- Integration of positioning, communications and cybersecurity in CAD test scenarios
- Comprehensive procedure for the allocation of test cases per testing platform
- Selection criteria and specification for proving ground test scenarios taking into account criticality
- Proving ground testing and evaluation

- Correlation between simulation and proving ground results
- 6 Harmonised, open result compilation and sharing
- 7 Field trial test methodology description
- 8 Cyber-security principles and integration in the testing methodology

13/09/2019 4




HEADSTART approach





Motivation for the KETs

- HEADSTART will enhance current Connected Automated Driving (CAD) testing methods dealing with cyber-security, V2X Communications and Positioning.
- Digitalization of the automotive industry is the main enabler for technologies such as V2X communication and High Precision Positioning, key for CADs functions but at the same time pose a great challenge in terms of cyber-security.
- HEADSTART will deliver <u>new testing</u> <u>procedures and tools for assessing</u> connected and automated vehicles to guarantee safe operations in every condition.
- Strong interconnections on the other two KETs (Positioning & Communication) as they are both potential sources for attacks






What we mean by KETs in HEADSTART

- Positioning for CAD functions
 - ✓ Detection systems able to improve CAD safety
 - "relative" & "absolute" positioning systems
- Communication for CAD functions
 - ✓ Additional information collected from external world that cannot be directly senses by current sensors
 - Vehicle to Vehicles (or Infrastructure) Communication via <u>ETSI ITS-G5</u> or Cellular-V2X (LTE-V2X or 5G-PC5)
- Cyber-security for CAD functions
 - ✓ Identification of failures capable to compromise the safety of CAD functions



The need for "Positioning" for road user services



GNSS only

Integration

with other

sensors


mandatory

Services Acceptable value Trip travel information Stolen vehicle recovery 25 meters (95% confidence) Fleet management Dynamic route guidance **Emergency call** In-car navigation 5 meters (95% confidence) Road-user charging Urban traffic control Intelligent Speed Collision avoidance 1 meters (95% confidence) Adaptation (ISA) Restraint deployment **HEADSTART** Automated highway 0.1 meters (95% confidence) Lane control objective



International standard are emerging:

- CEN/CENELEC, EN16803: "Use of GNSS-based positioning for road Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS)",
- ETSI TS 103 246 1-5: "Satellite Earth Stations and Systems (SES), GNSS-based Location Systems (GBLS)".
- ✓ Sky attenuation conditions:
 - Model definition for:
 Open-sky, Urban canyon,
 Asymmetric sky visibility.
- ✓ Moving Location Target Scenario
 - Track trajectory
 - Simulated trajectory to assess the positioning performances.





What's missing?

 A unified testing methodology able to represents real environment conditions based on virtual scenarios for Connected Automated Driving (CAD) functions

✓ What happen to GNSS signals in critical scenarios?
 - ETSI TS 101 539-2 V2X Intersection Collision Risk Warning (ICRW)

✓ How vehicle sensors (camera, radar, lidar, maps) can been modeled into the testing methodology to improve the positioning performances?

Estimated position error
Vehicle position at time t₁

Vehicle position at time t₂


Safe crossing of vehicles at time t₅

✓ How to compare solutions relying on different positioning architectures?



HEADSTART approach

- Starting from a database of CAD scenarios;
- Include the environmental conditions into the communication channel and perception layers of the device under test:
 - ✓ GNSS: introduce range errors due to environment conditions (urban canyons, interference levels).
 - ✓ Camera: obstruction of lane marking information.
 - ✓ Others...





Goals for V2X Communication

- In HEADSTART available V2X communication technologies will be analysed and elaborated:
 - ✓ ETSI ITS-G5 IEEE 802.11p,
 - ✓ Cellular C-V2X: LTE-V2X→3GPP Rel.14, 5G-V2X→PC5
- Relevant use cases for V2X communication for CAD are being identified based on use cases from other projects.
- Transfer V2X testing and assessments methods, tools and approaches and adapt it to the specific needs of the CAD functions testing methodology




V2X based assessment means?

What do we want to assess? What can we assess?

- Low-level communication functions:
 - ✓ Propagation/physical layer/media related
 - Propagation: LoS aspects, reflections, scattering, delays, path loss
 - Channel: availability, contention, congestion
 - SNR, BER
 - Encoding/decoding delays/errors



- ✓ High-level communication functions:
 - Application level
 - Logical testing
 - Event based, sharing intentions, interaction protocol






V2X communication approach

- Creation and use of Expert Network:
 - ✓ Consultation with stakeholders from the industry, research and standardization bodies to identify strengths and weaknesses of current V2X communication systems and their performance.
 - ✓ Lessons learned and knowledge transfer: adapt procedures successfully used in other domains, other project.
- Integration of V2X communication into CAD scenario tooling
 - ✓ Define operational settings and metrics for V2X communication (ongoing)
- V2X testing in HEADSTART
 - ✓ Use case(s) allowing to apply developed V2X communication assessment tests

V2X extension for scenario assessment

- Can we make this generic within one V2X Communication assessment scenario
- Will we always need more specific communication scenarios depending on:
 - ✓ Type of application, type of deployment
 - ✓ RF-Obstacles: Urban, Non-urban, Highway
 - ✓ Number of vehicles to be simulated
 - ✓ Channel degradation
- Multiple connected vehicles communicating (V2V)
 - ✓ System-of-system (multiple vehicles: Platooning application)
 - ✓ Multiple radio systems (ETSI ITS-G5, Cellular-V2X, new technologic
 - ✓ Mixed traffic conditions: unequipped vehicles
- How to integrate existing tools?
 - ✓ Radio simulators, Network simulators, Application simulators, Traffic simulators.

Scalability problems in RF-simulation generation





Cybersecurity Motivation

Digitalization of CADs features imposes to car makers to protect the vehicles against Cyber attacks.

 Connected vehicle provides opportunities for a malicious hacker to <u>disrupt normal vehicle</u> operations without the need of <u>direct access</u> into the car



The attacks can range from annoyances:

- ✓ Sounding the horn,
- ✓ Turn on the radio.



To small damages and anomalies into car operation:

- ✓ Collision at slow speed during parking manoeuvre,
- Malfunctioning fuel pump.



- Turning the steering wheel at high speed,
- ✓ Perform harsh braking.





Cybersecurity in HEADSTART terms

- ✓ What are the possible cyber threats?
 - Define the potential threats and types of attacks that directly affect CADs
- ✓ What are potential consequences of cyber attacks?
 - different kind of consequences which can be triggered directly or indirectly by attackers
 - In HEADSTART potential consequences of driving function fails are most important

Source: Cyber Security Threats of Connected Vehicles – Consequences and safety solutions, Dr. Houssem Abdellatif, TÜV SÜD




✓ Standardization on cyber-security ongoing but not focused specifically to CADs functions yet: EU Cyber-security Act, SAE J3061 "Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-physical" systems", ISO/SAE 21434 "Road vehicles – Cybersecurity engineering" 17



13/09/2019

Cybersecurity approach 1/2

- Following functional safety approach
 - 1. Well defined development process (e.g., ISO 26262 for safety)
 - Risk/vulnerability assessment covering a wide range
 - 2. Simulations (on component level) targeting several scenarios and test cases
 - 3. Physical/real tests: a set of specific tests carried out on vehicle level
 - For safety: "Handful well-defined tests → vehicle safe"
 - Same approach for cybersecurity?
- Lessons learned and knowledge transfer
 - Adapt procedures successfully used in other domains; learn from best practices from ICT
 - Analyse security known flaws
- Cybersecurity testing in HEADSTART
 - ✓ At least one Use case allowing to apply developed cyber-security assessment procedures/tests





Cybersecurity approach

Security goals are categorized in:

- ✓ Integrity
- ✓ Authenticity
- ✓ Availability
- Confidentiality

Examples for Security Controls L3 & L4 functions			& L4 functions
Security Goal	Environmental Level Security Controls	Vehicle Level Security Control	Component Level Security Controls
Integrity	• Integrity management of access rights	 Secure communications, TLS, IPsec, etc. Functional separation and a trusted execution of the control flow 	Access controlControl flow integrity (CFI)Trust anchor
Authenticity	 Access control to development and production sites Secure communications 	 Message authentication codes etc. 	 Secure boot with a trust anchor, e.g. public keys in OTP
Availability	 Intrusion detection mechanisms to react to potential attacks 	Congestion control on gateways/routers	Rate limiting on networking interfacesDeterministic scheduling
Confidentiality	 Access control to documentation 	Encryption of data in flightTLS, IPsec, etc.	Encryption of data at restSecure storage

Source: Safety First for Automated Driving, White Paper, Aptiv et.al.



Exploitation of the initiatives: SAFERtec project

- Cyber-security insights from SAFERTec project
 - Attackers do not have physical access on the Infrastructure
 - Distinction on communication: roadside units vs cloud-based services
- Identification of threats via the ETSI TR 102 893 TVRA Method (Threat, Vulnerability and Risk Analysis)

Threats from SAFERTec


Electromagnetic communication interference disturbance (intentional) Link layer flooding Equipment spoofing Data manipulation Data leakage Sabotage Firmware/Application alteration Firmware/Application reverse engineering Extreme solicitation System unauthorised access

Network unauthorised access
Downgrade attack on the mobile communication link
Data breaches
Account hijacking
Advanced persistence threats
Abuse of cloud services
Data loss
Malicious Insider



SAFERtec Assurance Framework Toolkit

- SAFERTec will provide a security Assurance Framework Toolkit by December 2019
 - ✓ Are there any other similar tools already available?
 - ✓ How can they be optimally used for HEADSTART?





KETs discussion groups

Positioning

- ✓ The need for "Absolute Positioning"
- ✓ Localization assessment for automotive

Communication

- ✓ Is V2X communication becoming reality?
- Simulation environment and tools: HEADSTART integrated approach

Cyber-security

- Cyber-security for other CADs functions assessment
- ✓ Potential approaches for HEADSTART procedures



Definition of an Overall Methodology

